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The threat of bioterrorism and pandemics has highlighted the urgency for rapid
and reliable bioaerosol detection in different environments. Safeguarding against such
threats requires continuous sampling of the ambient air for pathogen detection. In this
study we investigated the efficacy of the Airborne Sample Analysis Platform (ASAP)
2800 bioaerosol sampler to collect representative samples of air and identify specific
viruses suspended as bioaerosols. To test this concept, we aerosolized an innocuous
replication-defective bovine adenovirus serotype 3 (BAdV3) in a controlled laboratory
environment. The ASAP efficiently trapped the surrogate virus at 5 × 103 plaque-forming
units (p.f.u.) [2 × 105 genome copy equivalent] concentrations or more resulting in
the successful detection of the virus using quantitative PCR. These results support the
further development of ASAP for bioaerosol pathogen detection.
Keywords: bioterrorism, airborne pathogens, air samples, ambient air sampler, virus detection, pathogen
detection, pandemic, bioaerosol
Introduction
In the current global geopolitical environment, the threat of a terrorist attack on the US
and international community has never been greater. A biological threat of great concern
to public safety is the use of an aerosolized pathogenic micro-organism that can be spread
in the air as happened with the anthrax attack of 2001 (Zink, 2011; Menrath et al., 2014).
In addition, an individual infected with a deadly pathogen can transmit the pathogen at a
high human density place or event. Some highly contagious and fatal biological agents that
are considered as bio-terror agents include Bacillus anthracis, Yersinia pestis, small pox, or
Marburg viruses and other emerging pathogens (Pohanka and Kuca, 2010; Menrath et al.,
2014).
Besides the intentional release of bioaerosols, natural outbreaks of infectious diseases may
occur without warning. Outbreaks including Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) in
2002–2004 (Christian et al., 2004), continuously evolving inﬂuenza virus strains (Khanna
et al., 2008) and recent infections with Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-
CoV; Hartl, 2013) underscore that such a natural threat is a real possibility. Early detection
of the pathogen can result in prompt intervention and treatment of exposed individuals as
well as conﬁne the secondary spread. Because of the high global mobility of people, the
failure to detect an intentional or natural outbreak of a contagious disease could result in
its rapid spread with catastrophic consequences. In order to eﬀectively safeguard against
such threats, it is critical to continuously monitor the air for the presence of pathogenic
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biological agents, particularly at high risk events or places such
as airports, malls, subway stations, cruise ships, aircraft, theaters,
stadiums, or schools. Such an approach requires an advanced
system that can continuously sample the ambient air for pathogen
detection.
Following the acquisition of an air sample, many diﬀerent
approaches including genome detection (Pyankov et al., 2007;
Goransson et al., 2012; Usachev and Agranovski, 2012), immune
(McBride et al., 2003; Rider et al., 2003; Skottrup et al., 2008),
optical (Pan et al., 2003; Sengupta et al., 2007), or other
biochemical assays (Hagleitner et al., 2001; Ho, 2002) have been
employed for speciﬁc detection of a large selection of pathogens
including bacteria, fungi, virus, or toxins. Since nucleic acids are
the absolute biomarkers, quantitative polymerase chain reaction
(qPCR) or quantitative reverse transcriptase-PCR (qRT-PCR)
is strongly established as the method of choice for accurate,
sensitive and speciﬁc identiﬁcation of a number of pathogens in
the same sample (Oppliger et al., 2011).
The Airborne Sample Analysis Platform (ASAP) 2800
(Thermo Scientiﬁc, USA) bioaerosol sampler provides an
eﬀective means of collecting representative samples of air for
subsequent laboratory analysis. At a ﬂow rate of 200 l/min, this
sampler pulls in the air which impacts on a piece of polyurethane
foam (PUF) inside a cassette called Integrated Bio Aerosol
Sampling System (iBASS) cartridge (Figure 1). In this study
we investigated the eﬃciency of the ASAP system to acquire
an aerosolized viral pathogen and detect it using a Taqman
qPCR. For testing, we aerosolized an innocuous replication-
defective bovine adenovirus serotype 3 (BAdV3) in a controlled
laboratory environment. The ASAP system successfully trapped
the virus-loaded aerosols which were subsequently detected
by qPCR.
Materials and Methods
Surrogate Virus and Cell Line
Replication-defective BAdV3 with E1 and E3 deletions (BAd-
E1E3) was constructed and propagated in fetal bovine
retinal cells transformed with adenoviral E1 (FBRT-HE1)
as described elsewhere (van Olphen et al., 2002; Sharma
et al., 2009). The FBRT-HE1 cells were grown as monolayer
cultures in Eagle’s Minimum Essential Medium (MEM; Life
Technologies, Gaithersburg, MD, USA) and supplemented with
10% reconstituted bovine serum (Fetal Clone III; Hyclone, Logan,
UT) and 50 µg/mL gentamycin. The virus puriﬁcation was done
by cesium chloride-density gradient centrifugation as previously
described (Graham and Prevec, 1991). The titration of virus was
done in FBRT-HE1 cell lines by plaque assay and expressed as
plaque forming units (p.f.u.)/mL. The DNA from the puriﬁed
virus was isolated, and genome copy equivalent of the virus was
calculated with the following formula where the ratio of genome
copy number to p.f.u was 40.
Number of virus genome copies = (DNA amount (ng) × 6.022 × 10
23
(Lenght (bp) × 109 × 650)
FIGURE 1 | Functioning of Airborne Sample Analysis Platform (ASAP)
System. Bioaerosols contained in the ambient air are sucked in through the
inlet of the ASAP bio-sampler and deposited on a strip of polyurethane foam
(PUF) contained in the Integrated Bio Aerosol Sampling System (iBASS)
cartridge. The individual polyurethane foam (PUF) strips are then processed
for pathogen isolation and nucleic acid extraction. Quantitative polymerase
chain reaction (qPCR) is set up for specific detection of the pathogen.
Isolation of Viral DNA
Puriﬁed BAd-E1E3 particles at various dilutions (0, 5 × 101,
5 × 103, 5 × 105, or 5 × 107 p.f.u.) in 50 µL were spiked in
the strips of PUF of the ASAP system. Virus was recovered by
adding 500 µl PBS to the PUFs and squeezing the liquid out of
the PUFs by centrifugation. Un-spiked virus samples served as
controls for the determination of virus recovery from the PUFs.
DNAwas isolated using the DNAzol reagent (Molecular Research
Center). The isolated DNA was resuspended in 25 µL of distilled
water, and the amounts of extracted nucleic acid were quantiﬁed
by a qPCR assay using known amounts of puriﬁed BAd-E1E3
nucleic acid as standards.
The eﬃciency of virus recovery was calculated as –
Eﬃciency =
Copy number of virus genome recovered from spiked samples
Copy number of virus genome recovered frompuriﬁed virus
× 100
Primers and Taqman Probes
Speciﬁc primers and a Taqman probe targeting the E4 region
of BAdV3 were designed using Primer Express 2.0 software
(Life Technologies). The sequence of primers and probes are as
follows:
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Forward primer – 5′- GGGCGAGCAATCAGCTCTTA– 3′
Reverse primer – 5′- CTAATCCACTGCCCATGTACACA– 3′
Probe – 5′- AGTCCCTGCCCACTTTTGCCTGG– 3′
The oligonucleotides were synthesized by Applied Biosystems.
The probe was labeled with FAM (6-carboxyﬂuorescein) at the
5′ end and with MGB (minor groove binder) at the 3′ end. The
primers and probes were reconstituted in TE buﬀer, aliquoted,
and stored at −20◦C until required.
Quantitative PCR
For absolute quantiﬁcation of the viral genome, a standard
curve was obtained using serial 10-fold dilutions (three copies
to 3 × 107 copies in 10 µl) of puriﬁed genomic DNA of BAd-
E1E3. The copy number of the viral genome was calculated
based on spectrophotometric quantiﬁcation and the molecular
mass of BAd-E1E3’s genomic DNA. A standard curve was run
for each set of assays. For qPCR, 10 µL of isolated DNA was used
in a 25 µL reaction using Taqman PCR core reagents (Applied
Biosystems, Foster City, CA, USA). The reaction mixture
contained 10x Taqman buﬀer, 250 nM of forward and reverse
primers, and 100 nM of Taqman probe along with other standard
kit components. Each reaction was carried out in duplicate.
The qPCR was performed using the Mx3000 Thermocycler
(Stratagene, Cedar Creek, TX, USA) with the following reaction
conditions: 50◦C for 2 min, followed by polymerase activation
(95◦C for 10 min), 45 cycles of denaturation (95◦C for 15 s)
and annealing/extension (60◦C for 1 min). The threshold cycle
(Ct) value for individual reactions was determined, and data
was analyzed with MxPro software to obtain the absolute copy
number of viral genome.
Evaluation of the Efficiency of Airborne Sample
Analysis Platform (ASAP System) in Trapping
Aerosolized Virus Particles
The basic procedure used to test the eﬃciency of the ASAP
System is depicted in Figure 1. The ASAP System was placed in a
biosafety cabinet [72 inches (183 cm) × 24 inches (61 cm) × 28
inches (71 cm)] and various dilutions [0, 5 × 101, 5 × 102,
5× 103, 5× 104, 5× 105, 5× 106, or 5× 107 p.f.u. (i.e., 0, 2× 103,
2 × 104, 2 × 105, 2 × 106, 2 × 107, 2 × 108, or 2 × 109 genome
copies equivalent)] of BAd-E1E3 in 0.5 ml were aerosolized
with the help of a vibrating mesh nebulizer system (Micro Air,
Omron) which was kept at distances of six inches (15 cm), one
foot (30 cm), and 4 feet (122 cm) from the air intake trap of
the machine. The machine was allowed to run for an additional
15 min after the completion of the aerosolization of each sample.
Each dilution was run in triplicate. One PUF per cartridge was
not exposed to the aerosols and was kept as a negative control.
After the run, each PUF was collected from the iBASS cartridge.
The nucleic acid was extracted from the virus trapped in the PUF
using the DNAzol reagent as per the manufacturers’ protocol
and resuspended in 25 µL of distilled water. The amounts of
recovered nucleic acid were quantiﬁed by qPCR.
In addition, to mimic the conditions in a normal work
environment, the same experiment was also conducted in a room
[9 feet (274 cm) × 10 feet (305 cm) × 10.8 feet (329 cm)] with
a regular ventilation system. This time the aerosols were created
by placing the nebulizer at greater distances [5 feet (152 cm) and
10 feet (305 cm)] from the ASAP system. ASAP was allowed to
run for an additional 1 h after completion of the aerosolization of
each sample. This was followed by extraction of nucleic acid and
quantitation by qPCR. All experiments including aerosolization
of virus were conducted as per approved institutional biosafety
protocols.
Results
Selection of a Surrogate Virus
In order to explore the usefulness of the ASAP system as a rapid
detection system for highly pathogenic agents in air samples,
we needed a surrogate virus which was safe but could mimic
the air sampling procedure that will be required for detecting
highly pathogenic infectious agents. We selected a replication-
defective bovine adenovirus (BAd-E1E3) having deletions in
the early region (E) 1 (E1) and E3. The E1 gene products are
essential for adenovirus replication; therefore, such E1-deleted
viruses can be grown only in cell lines that constitutively express
E1. Evenwild type BAdV3 is not pathogenic in human or animals.
For quantiﬁcation of BAd-E1E3 genomes by qPCR, a standard
curve was generated using serial dilutions of known amounts of
BAd-E1E3 genomes as standards (Figure 2A). The detection
limit of our qPCR assay was three genomes of BAd-E1E3.
Nucleic Acid Recovery from PUFs of ASAP
System
Since the sensitivity of the ASAP system also depends on the
eﬃciency of nucleic acid recovery from the PUFs containing the
trapped infectious agent, we spiked various amounts of puriﬁed
BAd-E1E3 onto the PUFs and processed them for nucleic
acid extraction by DNAzol (Molecular Research Center). The
amounts of extracted nucleic acid were quantitated by qPCR,
and known amounts of puriﬁed BAd-E1E3 nucleic acid served
as standards. The recovery of nucleic acid by this method was
approximately 88% (Table 1).
Evaluation of the Efficiency of ASAP System in
Trapping Aerosolized Virus Particles
Before conducting experiments, we determined the eﬃciency
of the ASAP system in trapping aerosolized virus particles in
addition to the likelihood of cross-contamination from one
PUF to another PUF in the iBASS cartridge. The ASAP System
was placed in a biosafety cabinet and various amounts (0,
2 × 103, 2 × 104, 2 × 105, 2 × 106, 2 × 107, 2 × 108,
or 2 × 109 genome copies equivalent per 0.5 ml) of BAd-
E1E3 were aerosolized with the help of a nebulizer kept at
distances of six inches (15 cm), 1 foot (30 cm), and 4 feet
(122 cm) from the air intake trap. Each sample was run
in triplicate. After the run, each PUF was collected from
the cartridge, and the nucleic acid was extracted from the
virus trapped in the PUF using the DNAzol protocol. The
amounts of the recovered nucleic acid were quantitated by qPCR
assay.
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FIGURE 2 | (A) Standard curve for absolute quantification of BAd-E1E3
genome. Tenfold serial dilutions of BAdE1E3 genomes were subjected to
Taqman qPCR, and the Ct values were plotted against the absolute numbers of
viral genome. (B,C) Detection efficiency of aerosolized BAd-E1E3 virus by
ASAP System at different distances. Different concentrations of BAd-E1E3
virus were aerosolized at different distances from the air inlet of the ASAP
System, placed in (B) biosafety cabinet [72 inches (183 cm) × 24 inches
(61 cm) × 28 inches (71 cm)], or (C) in a room [9 feet (274 cm) × 10 feet
(305 cm) × 10.8 feet (329 cm)]. The amount of BAd-E1E3 virus trapped on
the PUFs was quantified by qPCR and depicted as geometric means.
The ASAP biosampler eﬃciently collected and trapped viral
aerosols from the air. The minimum of 2 × 105 genome copies
TABLE 1 | Efficiency of recovery of BAd-E1E3 virus from PUF.
Virus amount
(p.f.u./50 µl)




5.0E+01 3.01E+01 2.58E+01 85.54
5.0E+03 1.09E+02 1.09E+02 99.81
5.0E+05 3.93E+04 2.95E+04 75.21
5.0E+07 6.50E+06 5.94E+06 91.28
equivalent (5 × 103 p.f.u.) of the input virus was detected
(Figure 2B). The amount of viral genome detected decreased
proportionately with the distance from the ASAP air inlet.
However, even at increased distance, the ASAP system was
sensitive enough to detect as low as 2 × 105 genome copies
equivalent (5 × 103 p.f.u.) of virus input. There was no cross-
contamination from one PUF to another; the negative PUF in a
cartridge remained negative after each run.
Subsequently, to mimic conditions similar to a normal
work environment, the experiment was conducted in a
room with a normal ventilation system. The ASAP system
was placed in the room, and increasing amounts of BAd-
E1E3 were aerosolized with the help of a nebulizer kept at
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distances of 5 feet (152 cm) and 10 feet (305 cm) from the
machine. Similar to the experiment in the biosafety cabinet,
the ASAP sampler eﬃciently collected and trapped the viral
aerosols from the air. In each experiment, there was a dose-
dependent increase and a distance-dependent decrease in the
number of genomes detected (Figure 2C). The minimum
detection limit remained unchanged at 2 × 105 genome copies
equivalent (5 × 103 p.f.u.) These results show that the ASAP
bioaerosol sampler can eﬃciently monitor ambient air for viral
pathogens.
Discussion
Over the last several decades, continuous air sampling coupled
with rapid and accurate detection of potential pathogens in
bioaerosols has attracted much attention. The ASAP bioaerosol
sampler has been tested to sample bacteria and spores
(Goransson et al., 2012) or metalliferous airborne particles
(Moreno et al., 2015) under ﬁeld conditions. However, the
ASAP sampler had not yet been tested for collection of viral
aerosols. In this study we investigated the eﬃcacy of the
ASAP bioaerosol sampler to collect and trap surrogate virus
aerosols from the air and detect them using suitable assays.
We demonstrated that in controlled laboratory conditions, the
ASAP sampler can eﬃciently trap surrogate BAd-E1E3 viral
aerosols that can be extracted from the PUFs and identiﬁed
using qPCR.
The purpose of bioaerosol sampling is to detect a biological
agent release so that the impact of a biological agent attack
can be reduced by executing appropriate responses with
minimal delay. However, the conventional time-consuming
laboratory methods involving culturing of microorganisms can
take days to identify the pathogen. Molecular biology techniques
such as qPCR are rapid, speciﬁc and sensitive enough to
identify the genus, species or strain of the pathogen. These
molecular assays can also be multiplexed to monitor more
than one bio-threat agent at a time. As qPCR assays are
quantitative, they can provide additional valuable information
regarding the concentration of pathogens in the ambient air.
We successfully detected the bioaerosols containing as low
as 2 × 105 genome copies equivalent (5 × 103 p.f.u.) of
BAd-E1E3. The technology of airborne pathogen detection
is still in the trial stage with no approved device in practical
application yet. Unfortunately, there are no set standards for
the sensitivity of airborne pathogen detection. However, the
detection of surrogate virus, released from a distance of 10 ft
(305 cm), and at a concentration as low as 2 × 105 genome
copies equivalent (5 × 103 p.f.u.) in a room the size of
972 cubic ft (27.5 cubic meters) is quite sensitive by many
standards.
The majority of the currently available air sampling platforms
are based on either impaction onto agar, impingement
into liquid, or dry impaction (Kesavan and Sagripanti,
2015), and each has its limitations. The direct collection
of microbes on agar is limited since not all species can be
cultured and others have distinct nutrient requirements.
The agar surface can also get saturated in areas with high
concentrations of microbes, and it cannot be used for
viruses.
For viruses and other viable microorganisms, the collection of
aerosols in liquid media/buﬀer is a preferred method. However,
the high rate of sample collection usually results in violent
bubbling of the collection ﬂuid resulting in considerable loss
of collection ﬂuid within short time (Agranovski et al., 2004).
Therefore, samplers based on liquid impinging or bubbling
usually operate at lower speeds. Some advancement has been
made to address these problems.
In the dry method (this study), the high volume of air
impacting on the PUF results in a strong desiccation eﬀect during
sampling which dramatically diminishes the viability of most
microorganisms. The ineﬃciency of dry impaction to collect
viable particles is often considered a limitation; however, this
method allows high rates of sample collection (>200 l/min)
enabling rapid analysis of a larger sample volume from the
environment.
The advantage of molecular techniques is that the genetic
material can be detected even from inactive microorganisms.
The speciﬁc detection of the genome of potentially dangerous
microorganisms in the aerosol samples is evidence of a direct
threat serious enough to raise an alarm and initiate appropriate
measures. In this study we use only a DNA virus to test the
eﬃcacy of ASAP sampler. The iBASS cartridge is removed after
every 4–8 h of operation for analysis of the microorganisms
collected on the PUF, and during this time the genetic material,
even from the RNA viruses, is expected to remain stable inside
the capsid/shell of the inactive virus. It has been shown that
phage PR772 and possibly other viruses as well, lost their
infectivity before the genome degradation (Turgeon et al., 2014).
Additionally, it has been demonstrated that the overall recovery
of airborne viruses should be estimated based on the detection
of genetic material rather than on viral infectivity (Verreault
et al., 2010; Turgeon et al., 2014). The use of molecular biological
methods is more likely to avoid false negative results than
infectivity assays for the detection of airborne viruses (Verreault
et al., 2010).
Aerosols are impacted on PUF which is often considered
superior to other substrates such as glass bead beds, cellulose
ﬁlters and other solid substrates. In particular, the PUF has
minimum particle bounce and re-entrainment losses and has
high collection eﬃciency without the need for greasing or oiling
the substrate (Crook et al., 1997; Kavouras and Koutrakis, 2001;
Lee et al., 2005). Furthermore, there is no pressure drop increase
with particle accumulation, and it is easy to recover the impacted
particles from the PUF.
In contrast to the ASAP bioaerosol system described in this
study, some samplers utilize a combination of immunoassay and
PCR to increase reliability and minimize the possibility of false
positives (Hindson et al., 2005). Furthermore, the number of
agents that can be detected in a sample is limited by the number
of primer/probe sets used for multiplexing. If the primer/probe
for a speciﬁc pathogen is not included in the mix, it would not
be detected. It is expected that in the future pathogen detection
will be based primarily on next-generation sequencing (NGS;
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Frey et al., 2014; Lecuit and Eloit, 2014). A key advantage of NGS
is that it allows identiﬁcation of a range of organisms (bacteria,
viruses, fungi). Subsequent adaptations to couple the ASAP
bioaerosol sampler with NGS platforms can potentially further
enhance its accuracy, sensitivity and spectrum of detection.
The ASAP sampler is highly portable (32 cm/side; 13.6 kg),
quiet in operation and has low energy usage (battery operable).
The ASAP system equipment is extremely user friendly
and allows changing the default settings of the machine
to add attachments such as a GPS, wireless and Ethernet
communication, temperature, and wind sensor, video exposure
monitoring with regular and infrared cameras to identify anyone
with fever who may be a carrier of a pathogen, and real-
time sensors for radioactivity. ASAP can be controlled using an
external trigger. All of these aspects of the ASAP 2800 system
would make it a dynamic and powerful tool in the detection of
airborne pathogens. The operation of the sampler can be adjusted
depending on the requirement of the facility, for example – 1 h
for each PUF for a total 8 h run or half an hour per PUF for
a 4 h run. Sample analysis can be done once every 4–8 h or
more frequently depending on the need of the facility. Once
released, the virus-loaded ﬁne bioaerosol particles can remain
suspended for hours (Yang et al., 2011) and available for detection
by bioaerosol samplers. At the end of each run, the sealed iBASS
cartridge can be aseptically removed and immediately analyzed
for the presence of any alarming genetic material. The rotating
iBASS cartridge can hold as many as eight diﬀerent sampling
PUFs along with a blank and negative control. The option of eight
diﬀerent samples allows the selection of speciﬁc times to acquire
samples. Since there is no cross contamination between the PUFs
in an iBASS cartridge, the sampling at diﬀerent times can be
useful to detect the time period when the airborne pathogen
was brought into the area. Standard operating procedures for
an ASAP system have already been developed by Lovelace
Respiratory Research Institute.
For maximum eﬃcacy in larger environments such as airports
or stadiums, the bioaerosol samplers can be installed at strategic
locations and work in conjunction with additional security
surveillance such as video, personnel, and canine units. The
ASAP bioaerosol sampler can also be used for evaluation
of microbial contamination in the working environments in
agricultural (Popescu et al., 2014; Sondergaard et al., 2014) or
industry (Skora et al., 2014) settings, investigation of microbial
metagenomics at distinct environments (Be et al., 2015) or in
hospitals to track, identify, and control nosocomial infections
(Sudharsanam et al., 2012).
Conclusion
Overall, these results suggest that the ASAP bioaerosol sampler
is a promising system for monitoring ambient air that has
been proven to work with viral pathogens. Additional testing
to evaluate its feasibility in real world conditions such as small
airports, hospitals, and military installations is recommended for
its further development and subsequent use for the detection of
real pathogens. This study also presents an ideal surrogate virus
that can potentially be used in additional studies investigating
viral aerosol sampling and detection. BAd-E1E3 is a DNA
virus that is quite stable in the environment. BAdV3 does
not cause any harm to humans and to ensure additional
safety it has been genetically modiﬁed to make it replication
defective.
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